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Abstract. Identity-based public key encryption facilitates easy introduction of
public key cryptography by allowing an entity’s public key to be derived from
an arbitrary identiﬁcation value, such as name or email address. The main prac-
tical beneﬁt of identity-based cryptography is in greatly reducing the need for,
and reliance on, public key certiﬁcates. Although some interesting identity-based
techniques have been developed in the past, none are compatible with popular
public key encryption algorithms (such as El Gamal and RSA). This limits the
utility of identity-based cryptography as a transitional step to full-blown pub-
lic key cryptography. Furthermore, it is fundamentally difﬁcult to reconcile ﬁne-
grained revocation with identity-based cryptography.
Mediated RSA (mRSA) [9] is a simple and practical method of splitting a RSA
private key between the user and a Security Mediator (SEM). Neither the user
nor the SEM can cheat one another since each cryptographic operation (signature
or decryption) involves both parties. mRSA allows fast and ﬁne-grained control
of users’ security privileges. However, mRSA still relies on conventional public
key certiﬁcates to store and communicate public keys. In this paper, we present
IB-mRSA, a simple variant of mRSA that combines identity-based and mediated
cryptography.Undertherandomoraclemodel,IB-mRSAwithOAEP[7]isshown
as secure (against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack) as standard RSA with OAEP.
Furthermore, IB-mRSA is simple, practical, and compatible with current public
key infrastructures.
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1 Introduction
In a typical public key infrastructure (PKI) setting, a user’s public key is explicitly en-
coded in a public key certiﬁcate which is, essentially, a binding between the certiﬁcate
holder’s identity and the claimed public key. This common model requires universal
trust in certiﬁcate issuers (Certiﬁcation Authorities or CAs). It has some well-known
and bothersome side-effects such as the need for cross-domain trust and certiﬁcate re-
vocation. The main problem, however, is the basic assumption that all certiﬁcates are
public, ubiquitous and, hence, readily available to anyone. We observe that this assump-
tion is not always realistic, especially, in wireless (or any fault-prone) networks where
connectivity is sporadic.
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In contrast, identity-based cryptography changes the nature of obtaining public keys
by constructing a one-to-one mapping between identities and public keys. Identity-
based cryptography thus greatly reduces the need for, and reliance on, public key cer-
tiﬁcates and certiﬁcation authorities. In general, identity-based encryption and identity-
basedsignaturesareusefulcryptographictoolsthatfacilitateeasyintroductionof,and/or
conversion to, public key cryptography by allowing a public key to be derived from ar-
bitrary identiﬁcation values such as email addresses or phone numbers. At the same
time, identity-based methods greatly simplify key management since they reduce both:
the need for, and, the number of, public key certiﬁcates.
Theconceptofidentity-basedpublicencryptionwasﬁrstproposedbyShamir[20]in
1984. Forthefollowing 16yearstheprogressinthisareahasbeen ratherslow.However,
recently, Boneh and Franklin developed an elegant Identity-Based Encryption system
(BF-IBE) based on Weil Pairing on elliptic curves [10]. BF-IBE represents a signiﬁcant
advance in cryptography.
Nevertheless, an identity-based RSA variant has remained elusive for the simple
reason that an RSA modulus n (a product of two large primes) can not be safely
shared among multiple users. Another notable drawback of current identity-based cryp-
tographic methods is lack of support for ﬁne-grained revocation. Revocation is typi-
cally done via Certiﬁcate Revocation Lists (CRLs) or similar structures. However, IBE
aims to simplify certiﬁcate management by deriving public keys from identities, which
makes it difﬁcult to control users’ security privileges.
Inthispaper,weproposeasimpleidentity-basedcryptosystemdeveloped atopsome
Mediated RSA (mRSA) by Boneh, et al. [9]. mRSA is a practical and RSA-compatible
method of splitting an RSA private key between the user and the security mediator,
called a SEM. Neither the user nor the SEM knows the factorization of the RSA modu-
lus and neither can decrypt/sign message without the other’s help. By virtue of requiring
the user to contact its SEM for each decryption and/or signature operation, mRSA pro-
vides fast and ﬁne-grained revocation of users’ security privileges.
Built on top of mRSA, IB-mRSA blends the features of identity-based and mediated
cryptographyandalsoofferssomepracticalbeneﬁts.1 LikemRSA,itisfullycompatible
withplainRSA.Withtheexceptionoftheidentity-to-public-keymapping,itrequiresno
special software for communicating parties. IB-mRSA also allows optional public key
certiﬁcates which facilitates easy transition to a conventional PKI. More generally, IB-
mRSA can be viewed as a simple and practical technique inter-operable with common
modern PKIs. At the same time, IB-mRSA offers security comparable to that of RSA,
provided that a SEM is not compromised. Speciﬁcally, it can be shown that, in the
random oracle model, IB-mRSA with OAEP[7] is as secure – against adaptive chosen
ciphertext attacks – as RSA with OAEP.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section gives a detailed
description of IB-mRSA. The security analysis is presented in Section 3 and the per-
formance analysis – in Section 4. In Section 5, IB-mRSA is compared with Boneh-
Franklin’s IBE. Finally, a brief description of the implementation is presented in the
last section. Some further security details can be found in the Appendix.
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2 Identity-Based mRSA
Themainfeatureofidentity-basedencryptionisthesender’sabilitytoencryptmessages
using the public key derived from the receiver’s identity and other public information.
The identity can be the receiver’s email address, user id or any value unique to the
receiver; essentially, an arbitrary string. To compute the encryption key, an efﬁcient
(and public) mapping function KG must be set beforehand. This function must be a
one-to-one mapping from identity strings to public keys.
The basic idea behind identity-based mRSA is the use of a single common RSA
modulus n for all users within a system (or domain). This modulus is public and con-
tained in a system-wide certiﬁcate issued, as usual, by some Certiﬁcate Authority (CA).
To encrypt a message for a certain recipient (Bob), the sender (Alice) ﬁrst computes
eBob = KG(IDBob) where IDBob is the recipient’s identity value, such as Bob’s email
address. Thereafter, the pair (eBob;n) is treated as a plain RSA public key and normal
RSA encryption is performed. On Bob’s side, the decryption process is identical to that
of mRSA.
We stress that using the same modulus by multiple users in a normal RSA setting
is utterly insecure. It is subject to a trivial attack whereby anyone – utilizing one’s
knowledge of a single key-pair – can simply factor the modulus and compute the other
user’s private key. However, in the present context, we make an important assumption
that: Throughout the lifetime of the system, the adversary is unable to compromise a
SEM.
Obviously, without this assumption, IB-mRSA would offer no security whatsoever:
a single SEM break-in coupled with the compromise of just one user’s key share would
result in the compromise of all users’ (for that SEM) private keys. The IB-mRSA as-
sumption is slightly stronger than its mRSA counterpart. Recall that, in mRSA, each
user has a different RSA setting, i.e., a unique modulus. Therefore, to compromise a
given user an adversary has to break into both the user and its SEM.
We now turn to the detailed description of the IB-mRSA scheme.
2.1 System Setting and User Key Generation
In the following, we use email addresses as unique identiﬁers of the public key owners
in the system. However, as mentioned above, other identity types can be used just as
well, e.g., Unix UIDs, HTTP addresses, physical addresses or even phone numbers. We
use the notation IDAlice to denote the user’s (Alice) email address that will be used to
derive the public exponent.
In the initialization phase, a trusted party (CA) sets up the RSA modulus for all
users in the same system (organization or domain). First, CA chooses, at random, two
large primes p0 and q0 such that p = 2p0+1 and q = 2q0+1 are also primes, and ﬁnally
sets n = pq. We note that, since n is a product of two strong primes, a randomly chosen
odd number in Zn has negligible probability of not being relatively prime to (n). (See
Section 3 for further discussion.) Hence, the mapping function KG can be quite trivial.
(Our current implementation uses the popular MD5 hash function.)
The public exponent eAlice is constructed as the output of KG(IDAlice) repre-
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set. This ensures that eAlice is odd and, with overwhelming probability, relatively prime
to (n). The complete IB-mRSA key generation proceeds as in Figure 1.
Algorithm IB-mRSA.key (executed by CA)
Let k (even) be the security parameter
1. Generate random k=2-bit primes: p
0;q
0 s.t. p = 2p
0 +1;q = 2q
0 +1 are also
prime.
2. n   pq;e 2R Z

(n);d   e
 1 mod (n)
3. For each user (Alice):
(a) s   k   jKG()j   1
(b) eAlice   0
sjjKG(IDA)jj1
(c) dAlice   1=eAlice mod (n)
(d) dAlice;u
r   Zn   f0g
(e) dAlice;sem   (d   dAlice;u) mod (n)
Fig.1. IB-mRSA: User Key Generation
A domain- or system-wide certiﬁcate (Certorg) is issued by the CA after comple-
tion of the key generation algorithm. This certiﬁcate contains almost all the usual ﬁelds
normally found in RSA public key certiﬁcates with few exceptions, such as no real
public key value is given. In particular, it mainly contains the common modulus n and
(if applicable) the common part of the email address for all users, such as the domain
name.
For the sake of compatibility with other (not identity-based) RSA implementations
– including plain RSA and mRSA – the CA may, upon request, issue an individual
certiﬁcate to a user. In most cases, however, an individual user certiﬁcate would not
be needed, since not having such certiﬁcates is exactly the purpose of identity-based
cryptography.
2.2 IB-mRSA Encryption
To encrypt a message, the sender needs only the recipient’s email address and the do-
main certiﬁcate. The encryption algorithm is shown in Figure 2.
Algorithm IB-mRSA.encr
1. Retrieve n;k and KG algorithm identiﬁer from the domain certiﬁcate;
2. s   k   jKG()j   1
3. e   0
sjjKG(IDA)jj1
4. Encrypt input message m with (e;n) using standard RSA/OAEP, as speciﬁed
in PKCS#1v2.1[3]
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Since the receiver’s public key is derived from the receiver’s unique identiﬁer, the
sender does not need a public key certiﬁcate to ensure that the intended receiver is the
correct public key holder. Furthermore, fast revocation provided by mRSA obviates
the need for the sender to perform any revocation checks. The decryption process is
essentially the same as in mRSA. If a certain user needs to be revoked, the domain
security administrator merely notiﬁes the appropriate SEM and the revoked user is
unable to decrypt any further messages.
2.3 IB-mRSA Decryption
IB-mRSA decryption is identical to that of mRSA. To make this paper self-contained,
we borrow (from [9]) the protocol description in Figure 3. For a detailed description
and security analysis of additive mRSA, we refer the reader to [9].2
Protocol IB-mRSA.decr (executed by User and SEM)
1. USER: m
0   encrypted message
2. USER: send m
0 to SEM
3. In parallel:
3.1 SEM:
(a) If USER revoked return (ERROR)
(b) PDsem   m
0dsem mod n
(c) Send PDsem to USER
3.2 USER:
(a) PDu   m
0du mod n
4. USER: M   (PDsem  PDu) mod n
5. USER: m   OAEP Decoding ofM
6. USER: If succeed, return (m)
Fig.3. IB-mRSA: Decryption
3 Security of Identity-based mRSA
We now examine the security of IB-mRSA/OAEP in a setting with n users. All users
shareacommonRSAmodulusN andeachuser(Ui)isassociatedwithauniqueidentity
IDi, which is mapped into an RSA public exponent ei via a mapping function KG.
3.1 Security Analysis
In the following, we argue that if KG is an appropriate hash function, IB-mRSA/OAEP
is semantically secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA-2) in the ran-
dom oracle model. We use the term indistinguishability which is a notion equivalent to
semantic security. (See [6] for the relevant discussion.)
2 There is also a very similar multiplicative mRSA (*mRSA) ﬁrst proposed by Ganesan [13].6 Xuhua Ding and Gene Tsudik
Our analysis is mainly derived from the results in [5], ([4] has similar results) where
it was shown that a public-key encryption system in a multi-user setting is semantically
secure against certain types of attacks if and only if the same system in a single-user
setting is semantically secure against the same attack types.
IB-mRSA/OAEP is obviously an encryption setting with many users, although they
do not physically possess their own private keys. To prove semantic security, we begin
byassertingthatIB-mRSAinsingle-usermodeisequivalenttothestandardRSA/OAEP,
which is proven secure against CCA-2 under the random oracle [12]. Next, we apply the
theorems in [5] with the condition that all users are honest. To remove this condition,
we analyze the distribution of views of the system from users and outside adversaries.
Furthermore we introduce an additional requirement for the key generation function
(division-intractability) so that we can neglect the possibility of an attack from legiti-
mate (inside) users, which is a problem unique to our setting. In the end, we argue for
semantic security of IB-mRSA/OAEP.
WeuseSuccIB
1 (t;qd)todenotethemaximumadvantageofalladversaryalgorithms
in polynomial time t, attacking IB-mRSA/OAEP with one user, SuccIB
n (t;qd;qe) for
the setting with n users, and SuccR(t;qd) for RSA/OAEP. In the above, qd(qe) denote
the maximum number of decryption (encryption) queries allowed for each public key.
Throughout the analysis, we consider semantic security against CCA-2 under the ran-
dom oracle assumption. To conserve space, we omit mentioning them in the following
discussion.
We begin with the following lemma.
Lemma 1. IB-mRSA/OAEP system in a single-user setting is polynomially as secure
as standard RSA/OAEP encryption, i.e.,
SuccIB
1 (t;qd) = SuccR(t0;qd)
where c is constant value, t0 = t + c.
The proof is in Appendix A.2. Basically, if there exists an algorithm breaking the se-
curity of IB-mRSA/OAEP in a single-user mode, we can build upon it an algorithm
breaking standard RSA/OAEP with the same success probability and constant extra
overhead. Of course, it is easy to see that breaking RSA/OAEP implies breaking IB-
mRSA. Thus, we claim that they are equally secure.
For the multi-user setting, we cannot claim that IB-mRSA with n users is seman-
tically secure by directly applying the security reduction theorem in [5]. The reason is
that our system is not a typical case referred in [5]. Sharing a common RSA modulus
among many users results in their respective trapdoors not being independent; conse-
quently, there could be attacks among the users. Furthermore, users in IB-mRSA may
have the incentive not only to attack other users, but also to attempt to break the under-
lying protocol so that they can bypass the mandatory security control of the SEM.
However, assuming for the moment, that all users are honest, we can obtain the
following lemma derived from [5].
Lemma 2. IB-mRSA/OAEP system with n users is semantically secure if all n are hon-
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SuccIB
n (tn;qd;qe)  qenSuccIB
1 (t1;qd)
where t1 = tn + O(log(qen))
When all users are honest, there are clearly no attacks. Thus, IB-mRSA with multi-user
can be considered as an example of encryption system in [5] where each user has an in-
dependent trapdoor. We adapt the original proof in [5] in order to claim security against
CCA-2 since no user actually knows its own trapdoor in IB-mRSA. See Appendix A.3
for details.
Unfortunately, in a real application, all users cannot be assumed to be trusted. To
remove this condition in Lemma 2, we have to examine both the information an inside
user can observe and the operations an inside user can perform.
For a given entity (user or set of users) we use an informal term “system view” to
refer to the distribution of all inputs, outputs, local state information as well as scripts
of interactions with decryption oracles, encryption oracles, and the SEM. The system
view for an outside attacker is denoted as:
V1 ::= PrfN;(e0;:::en); O; E; D; SEMg
while the system view for a set of users is:
V2 ::= PrfN;(e0;:::;en);fduig; O; E; D; SEM; du;ng
where fduig is the set of user key-shares;  O; E; D are three scripts recording all
queries/answers to the random oracle, encryption oracles and decryption oracles, re-
spectively;  SEM is the script recording all requests/replies between all users and the
SEM;  du;n is the script recording all n users’ computation on ciphertexts with their
own secret key-share dui. We claim in Lemma 3, that being an IB-mRSA user does not
afford one extra useful information as compared to an outside adversary.
Lemma 3. Under the adaptive chosen ciphertext attack, the system view of the outside
adversary (V1), is polynomially indistinguishable from the combined system view (V2)
of a set of malicious insiders, in the random oracle model.
Proof. See Appendix A.4 for details. 
Thus far, we have shown that insider adversaries do not gain advantages over out-
siders in terms of obtaining extra information. However, we also need to consider the
privileged operations that an insider can make. In IB-mRSA, each user is allowed to
send legitimate decryption queries to its SEM. In conventional proofs, the adversary is
not allowed to query its oracle for the challenge ciphertext. However in our case, an in-
side adversary can manipulate a challenge ciphertext (intended for decryption with di)
into another ciphertext that can be decrypted with its own key dj and legally decrypt it
with the aid of the SEM.3
3 A simple example is as follows. Suppose ei = 3  ej. Then, given c = m
ej mod n, User Ui
can compute c
0 = c
3 = m
ei mod n, which can be decrypted by Ui with the help from its
SEM. The notion of non-malleability does not capture this attack since it is deﬁned under a
single ﬁxed private/public key pair.8 Xuhua Ding and Gene Tsudik
We now have to consider the probability of such attacks in our setting. More gener-
ally, let ea0;:::;eav be the set of public keys of v malicious users, and Ev =
Q
ai eai.
They may attempt to use some function f, which takes a challenge c = mx mod n as
input and outputs ciphertext c0 = mEv. We offer the following lemma to address the
conditions for the existence of such f.
Lemma 4. Given two RSA exponents x;y and modulus n, let f be a polynomial time
complexity function s.t. f(mx) = my mod n. Such f exists iff xjy.
Proof. See Appendix A.5 for details. 
According to Lemma 4, we require negligible probability of obtaining a user’s pub-
lic key which is a factor of the product of a set of others. A similar requirement ap-
pears in a signature scheme by Gennaro et al. in [14]. They introduce the notion of
division intractability for a hash function. Informally, a hash function H is Division
intractable if it is infeasible to ﬁnd distinct (X1;:::;Xn;Y ) in its domain, such that
H(Y )j
Q
i(H(Xi)). Denoting Prdiv(H) as the probability that H fails to hold this
property, we have the following proposition regarding the security of IB-mRSA in a
multi-user setting.
Proposition 1. IB-mRSA/OAEP encryption offers equivalent semantic security to
RSA/OAEP against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks in the random oracle model, if
the key generation function is division intractable.
In summary, Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 enable us to remove the condition of Lemma 2
where all users are assumed to be honest, by requiring the key generation function to
be division intractable. Thus, we can reduce the security of IB-mRSA/OAEP in multi-
user setting into single-user, which is as secure as standard RSA/OAEP according to
Lemma 1.
3.2 The Public Key Mapping Function
The key generation function KG in IB-mRSA is a hash function H. To ensure the secu-
rity of the scheme, H must satisfy the following requirements.
AVAILABILITY OF PUBLIC KEYS: TheoutputofH shouldhaveanoverwhelming
probability of being relatively prime to (n). Obviously, for the inverse (private key) to
exist, a public exponent can not have common factors with (n).
Note that in Section 2 the RSA modulus n is set to n = p  q and p;q are chosen
as strong primes p = 2p0 + 1, q = 2q0 + 1 where both p0 and q0 are also large primes.
Considering (n) = 22p0q0 with only three factors 2, p, q, the probability of the output
from H being co-prime to (n) is overwhelming on the condition that the output is an
odd number, because ﬁnding an odder number not co-prime to 4p0q0 is equivalent to
ﬁnd p0 or q0 and consequently factoring n.
COLLISION RESISTANCE: H should be a collision-resistant function, i.e., given
any two distinct inputs ID1;ID2, the probability of H(ID1) = H(ID2) should be
negligible. In other words, no two users in the domain can share the same public expo-
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DIVISION RESISTANCE: As discussed in Section 3.1, division intractability of
H is essential to the security of IB-mRSA. Gennaro et al. analyzed the probability of
division for hash functions in [14].
Moreover, Coron and Naccache showed in [11] that the number of necessary hash-
value to ﬁnd a division relation among a hash function’s outputs is sub-exponential to
its digest size k: exp(
p
2log2=2 + o(1)
p
klogk).
They suggested using 1024-bit hash functions to get a security level equivalent to
1024-bits RSA. However, such a strong hash function is not needed in our case. As
a point of comparison, the GHR signature scheme [14] needs a division-intractable
hash function to compute message digests, where an adaptive adversary can select any
number of inputs to the underlying hash function. IB-mRSA needs a hash function to
compute digests from users’ identities. In any domain, the number of allowed identities
is certainly much fewer compared to the number of messages in [14].
digest size in bits log2 complexity (in # of operations)
128 36
160 39
192 42
1024 86
Table 1. Estimated complexity of the attack for variable digest sizes.
To help select the best hash size for our purposes, we quote from the experiments
by Coron and Naccache [11] in Table 1. Taking the ﬁrst line as an example, an inter-
pretation of the data is that, among at least 236 hash digests, the probability of ﬁnding
one hash value dividing another is non-negligible. In IB-mRSA setting, the typical per-
sonnel of an organization is on the order of 210  217. Consequently, the possible
number of operations is far less than 236. Hence, we can safely use MD5 or SHA-1 as
the mapping function (H).
3.3 SEM Security
Suppose that the attacker is able to compromise the SEM and expose the secret key
dsem, however, without collusion with any user. This only enables the attacker to “un-
revoke” previously revoked, or block possible future revocation of currently valid, cer-
tiﬁcates. The knowledge of dsem does not enable the attacker to decrypt or sign mes-
sages on behalf of the users. The reason is obvious: note that Alice never sends her
partial results to her SEM. Thus, the attacker’s view of Alice can be simulated in the
normal RSA setting, where the attacker just picks a random number as dsem and make
computations on the ciphertext, messages to sign and signatures generated by Alice.
3.4 Security of Common Modulus
As mentioned earlier, using a common RSA modulus is clearly unacceptable in plain
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party knows a complete private/public key-pair. In fact, no coalition of users is able to
compute a public/private key-pair. The only way to “break” the system appears to be by
subverting a SEM and colluding with a user. Thus, in the context of IB-mRSA we need
to assume that a SEM is a fully trusted party, as opposed to semi-trusted in mRSA [9].
4 Performance Analysis
When plain RSA is used for encryption, the public encryption exponent e is typically
a small integer with only a few 1-bits. One example is the popular OpenSSL toolkit
[17] which uses 65;537 as the default public key value for RSA certiﬁcates. Encryption
with such small exponents can be accelerated with specialized algorithms for modular
exponentiation. However, in IB-mRSA setting, there is no such luxury of choosing spe-
cial exponents and a typical public exponent is a relatively large integer with (on the
average) half of the bits set to 1.
Keys RSA Modulus 1Kb RSA Modulus 2Kb RSA Modulus 4Kb
65;537 2 ms 4 ms 12 ms
128-bit key 7 ms 20 ms 69 ms
160-bit key 8 ms 25 ms 88 ms
Table 2. IB-mRSA Encryption: Performance Comparison of Different Encryption Keys.
We ran some simple tests to assess the cost of IB-mRSA encryption for public
keys derived from email addresses. The encryption was tested using OpenSSL on an
800MHzPIIIworkstation.Inthetests,weused:1)“default”encryptionexponent65;537
and 2) two other exponents of length 128-bit and 160-bit. For each key, we randomly
set half of the bits. The results are depicted in Table 2.
From the results in Table 2, we see that encryption with a randomized key does
introduce overhead, especially when the RSA modulus size grows. However, it is rather
negligible for the 1024-bit case, which is currently the most popular modulus size.
The decryption cost for IB-mRSA is identical to mRSA. The performance of mRSA
has been reported on by Boneh, et al. in [9]. For example, a 1024-bit mRSA decryption
costs around 35ms on an 800 MHz PIII, as compared to 7:5ms for plain RSA on the
same platform. We note that this is still much cheaper than 40ms that is needed for
Boneh/Franklin IBE decryption (for 1024 bits of security on a even more powerful
hardware platform).
5 IB-mRSA versus Boneh/Franklin IBE
We now provide a detailed comparison of BF-IBE and IB-mRSA. The comparison is
done along several aspects, including: practicality, revocation, security and cost of key
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Practicality and Performance: Although BF-IBE and IB-mRSA have similar architec-
tures, the underlying cryptographic primitives are completely different. Compared to
the elliptic curve primitives used in BF-IBE, IB-mRSA is much easier to deploy since
RSA is currently the most popular public key encryption method. Recall that IB-mRSA
is fully compatible with standard RSA encryption. Moreover, if optional individual cer-
tiﬁcates are used, IB-mRSA is fully compatible with current PKI-s. Thus, it offers a
smooth and natural transition from normal ID-based to public key cryptography.
In addition, IB-mRSA offers better performance than BF-IBE. As seen from the
comparison in Table 3, IB-mRSA is noticeably faster than BF-IBE in both key genera-
tion and message encryption.
BF-IBE IB-mRSA
Private Key Generation 3ms < 1ms
Encryption Time 40ms 7ms
Decryption Time 40ms 35ms
Table 3. Performance Comparison of BF-IBE (on PIII 1GHz) and IB-mRSA (on PIII 800MHz)
with 1024-bit security.
Revocation: BF-IBE does not explicitly provide revocation of users’ security capabili-
ties. This is natural since it aims to avoid the use of certiﬁcates in the course of public
key encryption. On the other hand, revocation is often necessary and even imperative.
The only way to obtain revocation in normal IBE is to require ﬁne-grained time-
dependent public keys, e.g., public keys derived from identiﬁers combined with time- or
date-stamps. This has an unfortunate consequence of having to periodically re-issue all
private keys in the system. Moreover, these keys must be (again, periodically) securely
distributed to individual users. In contrast, IB-mRSA inherits its ﬁne-grained revocation
functionality from mRSA [9]. IB-mRSA provides per-operation revocation, whereas,
BF-IBE provides periodic revocation, which clearly has coarser granularity. Essentially,
IB-mRSA allows revocation to commence at any time while BF-IBE revokes users by
refusing to issue new private keys. However, BF-IBE does not prevent the type of an
attack whereby an adversary who compromises a previous or current key can use them
to decrypt previously encrypted messages. This can be a serious attack in some settings,
such as military applications.
Trusted Third Parties: Both SEM in IB-mRSA and PKG in BF-IBE are trusted third
parties. However, the difference in the degree of trust is subtle. A SEM is fully trusted
since its collusion with any user can result in a compromise of all other users’ secret
keys, due to the shared RSA modulus. Nonetheless, a compromise of a SEM alone
does not result in a compromise of any users’ secret keys. A PKG is a real TTP since it
knows all users’ secrets, thus, a compromise of a PKG results in a total system break.
While a PKG can also be a CA at the same time, a SEM can never be allowed to play
the role of CA.12 Xuhua Ding and Gene Tsudik
If BF-IBE is used to provide ﬁne-grained revocation, frequent key generation and
secure key distribution are expensive procedures. Although a PKG is not required to be
on-line all of the time, in practice, it must be constantly available since users do not all
request their current private keys at the same time. Therefore, as the revocation interval
in BF-IBE gets smaller, the on-line presence of a PKG becomes more necessary.
6 Implementation
We implemented IB-mRSA for the purposes of experimentation and validation. The im-
plementation is publicly available at http://sconce.ics.uci.edu/sucses.
The software is composed of three parts:
1. CA and Admin Utilities: domain certiﬁcate, user key generation, (optional) certiﬁ-
cate issuance and revocation interface.
2. SEM daemon: SEM process as described in Section 2
3. Client libraries: IB-mRSA user functions accessible via an API.
The code is built on top of the popular OpenSSL [17] library. OpenSSL incorpo-
rates a multitude of cryptographic functions and large-number arithmetic primitives. In
addition to being efﬁcient and available on many common hardware and software plat-
forms, OpenSSL adheres to the common PKCS standards and is in the public domain.
The SEM daemon and the CA/Admin utilities are implemented on Linux, while the
client libraries are available on both Linux and Windows platforms.
In the initialization phase, a CA initializes the domain-wide cryptographic setting,
namely (n;p;q;p0;q0) and selects a mapping function (currently defaulting to MD5)
for all domain clients. The set up process follows the description in Section 2. For each
user, two structures are exported: 1) SEM bundle, which includes the SEM’s half-key
dSEM
i , and 2) user bundle, which includes du
i and the entire server bundle.
The server bundle is in PKCS#7[1] format, which is basically a RSA envelope
signed by the CA and encrypted with the SEM’s public key. The client bundle is in
PKCS#12[2] format, which is a shared-key envelope also signed by the CA and en-
crypted with the user-supplied key which can be a pre-set key, a password or a pass-
phrase. (A user is not assumed to have a pre-existing public key.)
After issuance, each user bundle is distributed in an out-of-band fashion to the ap-
propriate user. Before attempting any IB-mRSA transactions, the user must ﬁrst decrypt
and verify the bundle. A separate utility program is provided for this purpose. With it,
the bundle is decrypted with the user-supplied key, the CA’s signature is veriﬁed, and,
ﬁnally, the user’s half-key are extracted and stored locally.
To decrypt a message, the user starts with sending an IB-mRSA request, with the
SEM bundle piggybacked. The SEM ﬁrst check the status of the client. Only when the
client is deemed to be a legitimate user, does the SEM process the request using the
bundle contained therein. As mentioned earlier, in order to encrypt a message for an
IB-mRSA, that user’s domain certiﬁcate needs to be obtained. Distribution and man-
agement of domain certiﬁcates is assumed to be done in a manner similar to that of
normal certiﬁcate, e.g., via LDAP or DNS.Simple Identity-Based Cryptography with Mediated RSA 13
6.1 Emailer client plug-in
To demonstrate the ease of using IB-mRSA we implemented plug-ins for the popular
Eudora[19] and Outlook[16] mailers. The plug-ins allow the sender to encrypt outgoing
emails to any client in the common domain using only one domain (organizational)
certiﬁcate. When ready to send, the sender’s plug-in reads the recipient’s email address
and looks up the organization certiﬁcate by using the domain name in the email address.
A screen snapshot of the Eudora plug-in is shown in Figure 4.
IBE
Fig.4. Eudora IBE Plugin
WhenanemailmessageencryptedwithIB-mRSAisreceived,aniconforIB-mRSA
is displayed in the message window. To decrypt the message, the user just clicks on the
IB-mRSA icon. The plug-in then contacts the user’s SEM to get a partially decrypted
message (if the user is not revoked). This is basically the same process as in mRSA.
7 Summary and Future Work
We described IB-mRSA, a practical and secure identity-based encryption scheme. It is
compatible with standard RSA encryption and offers ﬁne-grained control (revocation)
of users security privileges.
Several issues remain for future work. It is unclear whether IB-mRSA can be shown
secure under the standard model (our argument utilizes the random oracle setting).
Moreover, we need a more formal analysis of semantic security. Another issue relates to
IB-mRSA performance. Using a hash function for public key mapping makes encryp-
tion more expensive than RSA since the public exponent is random (and on the average
half of the bits are set). We need to investigate alternative mapping functions that can
produce more “efﬁcient” RSA exponents.14 Xuhua Ding and Gene Tsudik
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A Proof of Security
A.1 Notations and Attack Model
Throughout the appendix, we use the following notations
– KG: Key Generation Function
– PE(): IB-mRSA/OAEP encryption system.
– DOdi: Decryption oracle with private key di
– RO:Random oracle
– N: The common RSA modulus
– ei=di: the i-th user’s public key/private key
– n: The number of users in PE
– qe:The number of encryptions allowed to be performed by each user
– qd: The maximum number of decryption queries the adversary can ask
Under the notion of indistinguishability of security, the adversary A takes the public key
and outputs two equal length messages m0;m1. Then, it gets a challenge ciphertext C,
computed by an encryption oracle which secretly picks b 2R f0;1g and encrypts mb.
A is challenged to output b with a probability non-negligibly greater than 1=2. In CCA
attack model, A is allowed to send queries to a decryption oracle, with the restriction
that A is not allowed to query on the challenge ciphertext c.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. The lemma means that if there exists an attack algorithm B with polynomial
time complexity, breaking the security of IB-RSA/OAEP with success probability ,
then there exists an attack algorithm F with the same polynomial degree of running
time, breaking RSA/OAEP with the same success probability; and vice versa.
The reverse direction is obvious. For any F that can break the indistinguishability of
standard RSA, it breaks IB-mRSA in single-user mode. Thus we have SuccR(t0;qd) 
SuccIB
1 (t;qd). Now we show SuccIB
1 (t;qd)  SuccR(t0;qd).
LetB bethepolynomialalgorithmattackingontheindistinguishabilityofPE(KG;N;1)
containing the single user U0 and its public key e0 and secret bundle du0. By allowing
B to know du0, we model the concern that the user in the system may be malicious.
We construct F as the adversary algorithm against the standard RSA/OAEP ( ^ N; ^ e) and
analyze its success probability and time complexity. Replacing KG function in PE by
a random oracle and acting as the random oracle and decryption oracle for B, A runs F
as follows.16 Xuhua Ding and Gene Tsudik
Experiment F
RSA( ^ N; ^ e;DOd;RO)
Select two random messages (m0;m1) with equal length. The encryption oracle
EOe secretly selects a random bit b 2R f0;1g and encrypts mb into the ciphertext
c. Given c, F runs the following to determine b.
1. Generate a random number r and a string id;
2. Initialize PE(KG;N) with single-user setting by N   ^ N, For user ID0  
id;
3. PE queries its random oracle (F) for e0;
4. e0   ^ e;
5. Initialize B with (m0;m1;c) and the target system PE(KG; ^ N) and user pub-
lic key e0, user bundle r;
6. Run B. The number of decryption queries is bounded by qd:
(a) For all B’s random oracle queries on OAEP encoding/decoding, F for-
wards them to RO and hands the answers back;
(b) For all B’s decryption oracle queries, F forwards them to DOd, and
hands the answers back;
(c) For B’s requests c to SEM (remember that the adversary might be inside
the system): F queries DOd on c. On getting the reply c
d mod n, F
hands back c
d=c
r mod n as the reply from SEM to B.
7. B halts outputting a bit b
0;
8. Return b
0;
Clearly, if B’s output b0 equals b, F successfully discovers b. This holds for all
polynomial algorithm B. Thus we have SuccIB
1 (t;qd)  SuccR(t0;qd). As for the time
complexity of F, the steps 15 and steps 7,8 take constant time, in that the cost is
independent of the security parameter, and step 6 runs in time t . Hence, the overall
time for F is t+c, which leads us to the conclusion of SuccIB
1 (t;qd) = SuccR(t0;qd).

A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. If all users in PE are considered trusted, we do not need to consider all attacks
originated from the inside users. The PE is therefore a IB-mRSA/OAEP in multi-user
setting, whose security for single-mode is proved in Lemma 1.
To show the polynomial reduction, the proof in [5] constructs an attack algorithm B
for single-setting. B calls another algorithm A, which can break the multi-user setting.
In order to argue the security in CCA2 model, B has to simulate the decryption oracles
for A. This is simple in their case, where B can invoke key generation function to
obtain all needed public/private key pairs. Unfortunately, this is not the case in IB-
mRSA setting, since the key generation will not give B the private keys. We slightly
revise the original proof.
Still, A targets at a multi-use setting with public keys fN;e0;:::;eng. However, we
construct B, targeting at fN;e =
Qn
i=0(ei)g. The algorithm for A’s decryption query
is shown below:Simple Identity-Based Cryptography with Mediated RSA 17
Decryption oracle simulator ( B;A;N;e0;:::;en;e =
Qn
i=0 ei)
B simulates decryption oracle for A with the help from its own oracle DOd.
(d is the corresponding secret key to (n;e).)
1. A ! B: (c;ei),
2. B ! DOd: c
3. B   DOd: c
0 = c
d mod n
4. B computes b =
e
ei
5. A   B: a = c
0b mod n
One can easily check that the answer a is exactly c1=ei. Thus, the proof for Theorem
4.1 in [5] still holds, which also proves this lemma.

A.4 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. (Sketch) No secret channel is assumed either in IB-mRSA protocol execution or
in the attack model. Thus, the outsider observes everything that the insider does, except
for fduig and  du;n. However, an outsider can simulate  du;n with the help of a random
oracle and the decryption oracles.
Note that a user’s key-share is nothing but a random number derived from an ideal-
ized hash function, which can be replaced by the random oracle RO. The outsider can
query RO and obtain a set of random values frig with the same distribution as fduig.
For each ciphertext c in  du;n (encrypted with eui) the adversary constructs   0
du;n by
computing cdui = cdi=cri, where cdi is obtained from the decryption oracle DOdi.
All c, dui,ri are random integers. (Note that c is also random since OAEP encoding is
applied before exponentiation). Thus, Prf du;ng = Prf  0
du;ng, which leads to V1 and
V2 having the same distribution 
A.5 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. We show that xjy is a sufﬁcient and necessary condition for the existence of f.
SUFFICIENCY: if xjy, i.e. 9k 2 N, s.t. y = kx. We construct f as
f : a ! ak mod n
One can easily check that f is the desired function.
NECESSITY: Suppose there exists a function f satisfying the requirement, while y =
kx + r, where k;r 2 N and 1  r  x. Given c = mx mod n, we can compute c1 =
f(c) = my mod n. Suppose g = gcd(x;y), i.e 9a;b 2 Z, s.t. ax + by = g. Thus, in
polynomial time, we can get mg by computing cacb
1 mod n. If we let x = hg, we have
actuallyconstructedapolynomial-timealgorithm,which,takingc = (mg)h mod nand
h;n as input, outputs c1=h mod n without knowing the factorization of n. (Note that x
is relatively prime to (n), which implies that h is also relatively prime to (n) and is
a valid RSA public key exponent.) However, this contradicts the RSA assumption. 